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Abstract 
 
 
Prior to the Trump’s presidency the US have performed as many 
as 400 armed drone strikes in Pakistan, killing approximately 
3.000 terrorist targets including key leaders that hold important 
value to the organizations. More than a decade these attacks were 
performed, yet we have not seen the end of the terrorist and 
insurgent’s presence in Pakistan. This leads into a thought 
whether the attacks were effective or not. Therefore, this study 
aims to analyze, predominantly  evaluating the use of the targeted 
killing strategy in this US counterterrorism effort. The study uses 
qualitative research method by using Robert A. Pape’s 
perspective in strategic effectiveness and David Galula’s 
counterinsurgency perspective. Those perspectives pointed out 
the cause of this situation is due to the inability of the attacked 
target set to trigger the destruction of the movement, the inability 
of the US to secure the ends, ways, and means of the operation 
which involve the dissociation between the population and the 
insurgents, their ability to forge proper cooperation with its local 
ally, and the un-favoring view of the local population toward its 
targeted killings practice has resulted in the infectivity of the 
strategy and a prolonged fight between the US and its opponent. 
In sum, it can be inferred that despite capable of eliminating 
numerous high-value targets the targeted killing strategy is 
deemed ineffective due to its inability to procure full destruction 
of its opponent and due to the inability of the US to secure the 
ends, ways, and means of the operation which would have 
increase the success of the strategy. 
 
© 2019 Published by Indonesia Defense University   
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INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of September 11, 2001 four 
airliners were hijacked and utilized as 
twisted 21st century kamikaze. Here, 
President George W. Bush and his 
administration concluded that the nation 
would undertake retaliatory action in 
addressing the threat posed by Al-Qaeda 
and other global terrorist organization 
which gave rise to the War on Terror 
(WOT). The WOT officially begins on 
October 7, 2001 with the invasion of 
Afghanistan. The invasion ended the reign 
of Taliban – as on November 24, 2001 the 
Taliban yield to the US forces. However, 
the majority of prominent Taliban fighters 
and its Al-Qaeda allies were able to escape 
and find safe-haven in Pakistan’s Federally 
Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA).  
“These fighters were allowed to build out a 
sanctuary by Pakistani officials who arrested 
Al-Qaeda terrorists in the cities, yet, 
generally left the Taliban (whom they had 
previously supported) untouched in the 
Pashtun tribal areas, thus, the Taliban took 
advantage of the situation to construct a 
state-within-state in FATA” (Williams, 
2010). This made the US National 
Intelligence to put FATA as “an important 
focus for the US national security”, a 
position that only few places on earth could 
gain (Markey, 2008).  
Addressing the situation in FATA 
becomes an important aspect to the US 
national interest. One, terrorist 
organizations that are nesting in FATA are 
a threat to the national security. Second, 
disintegrating these terrorist organizations, 
particularly the Taliban would bring a 
success to its nation building effort in 
Afghanistan – something that is threaten to 
fail with the Taliban’s continuous effort to 
send back fighters into the region. As 
Washington knew, it cannot trust Islamabad 
to deal with the militancy and infesting 
terrorist in FATA (due to its relationship 
with the Taliban), it decided to take the 
wheel. Therefore, “[since] June 19, 2004 
through the CIA, the nation launched what 
amounts to an all-out air borne wars against 
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces hiding out 
in FATA, it indisputably killed hundreds of 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders who are 
actively planning new terrorist attacks on 
the American homeland and or on the 
Coalition Forces in Afghanistan” 
(Williams, 2010). From 2004 to until 2016, 
up to 400 strikes have occurred in Pakistan.  
Nevertheless, the strikes soon fueled the 
conflicting debate between the proponents 
and the skeptics of the strikes. As the 
primary proponents of the strikes US 
officials continue to vigorously defended its 
utilization – crediting those targeted killings 
strikes to be “surgically precise and actually 
helping Pakistan” (Aslam, 2013). Likewise, 
the government and CIA officials 
characterized the armed drone’s targeted 
killings as major success, as it reduces the 
ability of “[terrorist] to carry out terrorism 
on American soil and against American 
(and British) aviation” (Coll, 2014).  
The skepticism of the strikes is 
commonly thrown by legal observers, 
academics, and humanitarian activists who 
viewed the effectiveness of the strategy as 
some total nonsense, generally due to 
subsequent collateral civilian casualties 
induce by the strikes, its impact to the life 
of the Pakistani population, and propelling 
the retaliation and reprisal of the terrorist 
movements, and the possible blowback 
effect caused by the increasing anti-
American view in Pakistan. For instance, 
“Living Under Drones” (International 
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution 
Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global 
Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), 
2012)– a report constructed from a nine-
months data analysis and interviews 
performed by a team of law students from 
Stanford and New York University, 
discovers that armed drones “were nowhere 
near as discriminating toward non-
combatants as the agency leaders have 
claimed” (Coll, 2014).  
These conflicting arguments on armed 
drone usage raises the interest of this study 
that is to analyze, predominantly the in 
evaluating the use of the targeted killing 
strategy in this US counterterrorism effort. 
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In this matter, the study intended to view the 
use of the strategy by answering a simple 
question, did the armed drone’s targeted 
killing strategy effective in the fight against 
terrorist and insurgents in Pakistan? 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In “Bombing to Win” (1996), Robert A. 
Pape, describes the effectiveness of military 
operations can be measured as either 
combat effectiveness or strategic 
effectiveness. Combat effectiveness 
“focuses on the idea of how efficiently a 
given force destroy a given target set, that 
is, how well bombs destroy its target”, 
while on the contrary, strategic 
effectiveness “focuses on whether the 
destruction of certain target set attains the 
intended political goal” (Pape, 1996). As 
this study intend to evaluate and analyze the 
effectiveness of the armed drone’s targeted 
killing strategy in counterinsurgency, 
hence, it will focus on the strategic 
effectiveness rather than combat 
effectiveness.  
Yet, as Pape did not further detail the 
aspects on how strategic effectiveness can 
be determine aside from hinting on the 
destruction of certain target set, another 
theory that can further help in analyzing 
targeted killing’s effectiveness is expressed 
by David Galula in his book 
“Counterinsurgency Warfare” (1964). 
Here, Galula discussed that certain aspects 
in counterinsurgency, like reviewing the 
ends, ways, and means of 
counterinsurgency operation. The ends 
define the objective of counterinsurgency, 
in this case is the population. Battle for the 
population is a major characteristic of the 
operation considering that insurgents (with 
their congenital weakness) sought to 
dissociate the population from 
counterinsurgent in order to balance the 
physical odds against them (Galula, 1964). 
For counterinsurgents the population serves 
to provide active support to the operation. 
According to Galula “if properly made and 
exploited [the population] is a basic source 
of intelligence” (Galula, 1964). Likewise, 
the exercise of political power also greatly 
affected by the tacit or explicit agreement of 
the population, or at worst on its 
submissiveness (Galula, 1964). Therefore, 
to dissociate the population from the 
insurgence and gain its support becomes an 
essential aspect to gain victory in 
counterinsurgency and in the fight against 
terrorism.  
Next is the ways. It describes the 
combination between political, economic, 
and information that is utilized a way to 
dissociates the population from the 
insurgents. Politic serves as an instrument 
of war and in counterinsurgency, 
considering that the objective is population 
itself politics becomes an active instrument 
of the operation – it is not enough for the 
government to set political goals, to 
determine how much military force is 
applicable, to enter or to break alliance – 
political actions remain foremost 
throughout the war (Galula, 1964). On the 
other hand, the term economic here 
correlates with the context of governance of 
the force. In simple, considering the spread 
of time and space in counterinsurgency, the 
use of force must be applied successfully 
area by area – to do so a degree of 
governance in ones use of force is necessary 
as to achieve victory. Subsequently, 
information plays an essential role in the 
course of the war. In counterinsurgency 
information obtained through the control of 
the population is utilized to identify 
insurgents, their locations, and even use a 
means of propaganda.  
Last is the means, this describes the 
human factor that is use to execute the ends 
and the ways of counterinsurgency 
operation.  
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This study employs a qualitative research 
method. The data is obtained from attentive 
review of relevant theories, literature, and 
previous research findings of the discussed 
topic. Then it translates both primary and 
secondary sources as the constituent of data 
in evaluating the issue of the discussed 
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topic. Likewise, the data obtained from both 
primary and secondary sources serves to 
validate the findings of this study.  
 
DISCUSSION  
According to Pape’s perspective, strategic 
effectiveness can be determined by 
focusing on the destruction of the target set 
attains the intended political goal. So, what 
is the target set? And what is the intended 
political goal of armed drone’s targeted 
killing strategy? 
Based on the post 9/11 national security 
policy it is indicated the US has identified 
leadership as the opponent’s target set or 
center of gravity. The National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism (NSCT) considers 
targeting terrorist leadership to be its first 
priority of actions and it act to support the 
principle and goal of the National Security 
Strategy (NSS), which serves as the US 
general security guideline and response in 
addressing the threat of global terrorist 
organizations (Jordan, 2009). In the NSCT, 
regardless of the diversity of their motives, 
sophistication, and strength, terrorist 
organizations all but share a basic structure 
witch its leadership being the catalyst for 
terror action (CIA, 2003). Based on the 
NSCT and the NSS, the US saw the 
leadership of terrorist organization to be the 
catalyst for terror action – they provide the 
overall direction and strategy that linked all 
of the structure bellow them. Thus, their 
absence or sudden changes would disrupt 
the organization’s ability to operate, 
weakening it, and depriving the members of 
strategic direction and ideological appeal. 
In sum, leadership becomes the target set of 
the fight against terrorism – where armed 
drones are utilized to performed the attacks.  
Subsequently, based on the target set, it 
can be argued that the purpose or the goal 
that is pursued by the strategy is to bring 
about the collapse or disintegration of 
global terrorist organizations. Based upon 
the context presented within the NSCT, it is 
considered that prioritizing one’s attacks on 
the leadership of terrorist organizations 
should led to the collapse or disintegration 
of the organization as leadership presents 
itself as an essential aspect to the 
preservation of the organization and an 
absence of leadership or its changes would 
disrupt the organization’s ability to operate 
– weaken their organizations, depriving the 
members of strategic direction and 
ideological appeal (Fisher, 2016).  
Nevertheless, targeting leadership as 
means to disintegrate the organization has 
its own issue. Though the elimination of 
leaders or leadership decapitation could 
cause leadership change of certain 
organization or disrupt their capability to 
operate, nonetheless, such has not always 
ultimately resulted with the collapse or 
disintegration of the terror organizations. 
Example, the killing of the Taliban leader 
Mullah Akhtar Mansour in 2016 at 
Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, though it 
brought a positive development to the US 
counterterrorism operation as it opens the 
opportunity for the Taliban and its members 
“to embrace peace talks with the Afghan 
government”, nonetheless, the impact of his 
death simply becomes “a minor setback to 
the organization capability to operate and 
constitute little battlefield impact” instead 
of resulting to the organization’s collapse 
(Seldin, 2016). Another example is the 
killing of the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan/Taliban Movement of Pakistan 
(TTP), Baitullah Mehsud in 2009 which did 
not disintegrate the organization as it 
continues to operate up to this day, despite 
having another of its leader killed. 
So, what causes this? Studies on the 
topic of leadership elimination/ 
decapitation suggest that it has something to 
do with the nature of the terrorist 
organizations. Here, Jenna Jordan argues 
that factor such as size, age, and structure of 
the organization influences their 
susceptibility against decapitation. 
According to Jordan, “going after the 
leadership of older and large organization 
would be counterproductive” (Jordan, 
2009). As an organization grew older it 
becomes less susceptible to leadership 
decapitation. On this context, Martha 
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Crenshaw, an expert on terrorism studies, 
also argues that “there is a threshold point, 
beyond which extremist organization 
becomes self-sustaining – the younger the 
organization, the greater the likelihood of 
its ending” (Crenshaw, 1991). Older 
organizations would have had more time to 
develop complex structures and should be 
more likely to withstand leadership 
decapitation that the younger ones (Jordan, 
2009). 
Moreover, Jordan stated that the type of 
the organization also affects the 
effectiveness of decapitation – “the 
susceptibility of organizations to 
decapitation should vary based on the 
organizational type” (Jordan, 2009). Here, 
Jordan predict that ideological 
organizations or groups will be most 
susceptible to leadership decapitation based 
on the context that these type of 
organizations or groups are likely to be 
dominated by an influential figure whose 
removal would weaken the focused and the 
purpose of the organization. Subsequently, 
Jordan argues, “religious organizations or 
groups should be most difficult to 
destabilize after the removal of a leader” 
(Jordan, 2009). Based on network analysis 
study it is determined that “religious 
organizations tend to be more 
decentralized”, therefore are harder to be 
weaken by leadership decapitation. 
Likewise, “religious organizations tend to 
have a sacred element, like martyrdom or 
divine conquest that inspires a level of 
dedication not seen in other movements, 
resulting in greater resilient and longer 
lifespan” (Jordan, 2009). Additionally, 
religious organizations or groups as an 
identity based organization are more 
resilient to decapitation, moreover, this 
particular type of organization tend to have 
a strong base of community support and 
hard to penetrate. 
In sum, ideological organizations are 
most likely to fall apart after a decapitation, 
while religious organizations are highly 
resilient. 
Additionally, scholar Kent Lyne Oots 
also argues on the effectiveness of 
decapitation. Oots, mentioned that although 
“terrorist organizations will not form 
without leadership – the organization 
depends on the leadership capability to 
recruit and maintain its committed 
members, nevertheless, a loss of leadership 
may not end terrorist activity, even if the 
cease to function as a unified organization” 
(Oots, 1989). This because “the end of the 
organization as a unified political 
movement does not necessarily the end of 
terrorist activity by its members – hence, a 
distinction must be drawn between the ends 
of organization the end of terrorist activity 
by its members” (Oots, 1989). Furthermore, 
it is possible that the loss of the 
organization’s leadership simply resulted 
with the organization splintering into 
smaller factions with new leaders. Based on 
such, it can be concluded that the nature of 
the targeted organizations would influence 
the end result of decapitation. Thus, an 
older, religious, and decentralize structured 
terrorist organization would be more 
resilient against decapitation. Likewise, it is 
also possible that leadership loss would 
cause the organization to splinter into 
smaller factions instead of collapsing or 
disintegrating, where they would then 
continue their operation under a new 
leadership.   
From Pape’s perspective it can be 
inferred that the targeted killing strategy is 
ineffective since attacks on the designated 
target set was unable to produce the 
intended result, that is the target’s 
disintegration. Nevertheless, based on this 
perspective the effectiveness of the strategy 
itself is simply confined to its capability in 
bringing destruction of its target. In 
evaluating the effectiveness of certain 
strategy used in counterterrorism effort it 
would not suffice to do so by solely looking 
at how well it destroys its target. There are 
other aspects that need to be taken into 
account. Here, Galula’s perspective could 
serve in expanding the analysis and to 
further understand the failure of the 
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strategy. In his book Counterinsurgency 
Warfare, he explains that in the war against 
insurgents there are some aspects that need 
to be taken into account, such involves the 
ends, ways, and means of the operation 
itself. 
As mentioned above, the ends describe 
the control of the population, particularly 
the locals and how such control could 
constitute to the success of the operation 
and therefore it is important to dissociate 
the population from the insurgents. The 
ways discussed the combination of politic, 
economic, and information utilize to ensure 
the dissociation between the population and 
the insurgents. While the means describes 
the human factor that is use to execute the 
ends and the ways of counterinsurgency 
operation. So how does all of these translate 
into determining the effectiveness of the 
targeted killing strategy? Through this 
perspective the effectiveness of the targeted 
killing strategy can be determine by 
evaluating whether in its practice, the 
strategy was able to cause the dissociation 
between the population and the insurgents 
in which the population supported the 
counterinsurgency itself. 
First, the ends which referred toward the 
control of the population. In its operation 
Pakistan however, the US may have failed 
in controlling the population. From the very 
first the Pakistani government was forced 
into supporting the US. As it is known 
Islamabad, particularly its Inter-Service-
Intelligence (ISI) had a long history with the 
Taliban movement and it was fairly difficult 
for them to detached themselves from the 
Taliban considering its significance to 
Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Likewise, the US 
themselves failed to maintain the 
government’s approval of its armed drone 
targeted killing practice in the region. While 
at first the government approved the 
strategy for its effort to stabilize the 
condition in its tribal area, nonetheless, 
such approval soon decreased mainly due to 
the collateral damage that that it caused and 
the US decision to no longer seek Pakistan’s 
approval in conducting the attacks. This in 
term made the government see the action as 
a violation of the nation’s sovereignty, 
although other aspect such as the support of 
some government structure (the intelligence 
and military) also influence the situation 
(Aslam, 2013).  
On the other hand, dissociating the local 
population from insurgents has already 
been a tough job from the beginning. In 
FATA, which is the epicenter of the 
operation, has often dubbed as Pakistan’s 
lawless frontier due to a multitude of 
militants, insurgents, or extremist groups 
which resides in the area (Johnston & 
Sarbahi, 2016). As such following the fall 
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, some 
of its surviving member and Al-Qaeda 
allies were able to escape into Pakistan 
where due to FATA tribal group’s 
Pashtunwali principle of hospitality, they 
were able to carved out a new safe-haven 
for them to train, recruit, and plot 
subsequent global terror attacks. Hence, it 
can be concluded that the US were not able 
to properly dissociate the population from 
the insurgents made the targeted killing 
strategy grew to be greatly disapproved by 
the population. 
Second, the ways discussed the 
combination of politic, economy, and 
information to dissociate the population and 
the insurgents. Necessarily, the operation in 
Pakistan involves this combination of 
politic, economy, and information. In 
politic, one can point out that the US 
decision to utilized the armed drone was 
generally due to the failure of the alliance 
between Washington and Islamabad. 
Despite having pledge themselves to 
support America’s WOT in truth Islamabad 
is playing a double game by still harboring 
support toward the Taliban. This inability to 
trust its own ally force the US to matters 
into its own hands. In economy, one can 
consider both the US economical support 
and pressure to Islamabad as part of the 
ways that it uses to cement Islamabad’s full 
cooperation to the cause. This part is true 
considering that since 2002 the US has 
given over $14 billion in aid to combat 
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terrorism and insurgents in the region 
(Ward, 2018). Likewise, withholding aid 
also becomes a way that the US use to 
pressure Pakistan into abandoning its 
relationship with the Taliban, for instance 
the Obama administration suspended $800 
million in aid in 2011 and withheld $350 
million in military in 2016 (Aleem, 2018). 
But so far this tactic has not work. 
Subsequently, economic also concerns with 
the utilization of the force itself – how it 
will be use in the wide are of the operation. 
This explains the use of the armed drones in 
the operation since the weapon itself is able 
to travel large distance and perform attack 
at moment’s notice. It has also been noted 
that considering the danger of the location 
and the difficulty of the terrain which the 
operation take place, the armed drone has 
provided the US with access to the location 
(Kreps, 2016). Thus, it can be inferred that 
the use of the armed drones has becomes a 
way for the US in accommodating the vast 
movement of the force that is less costly 
than deploying troops to the locations. 
Additionally, information plays a crucial 
role in the operation. In this matter, the US 
has been keen in sharing the success of its 
armed drone attacks in eliminating high-
value targets. This is done to show progress 
and build an image of success of the 
operation. Yet, the US has also be suggested 
to be reluctant in openly acknowledging the 
presence of casualties and damages to cause 
by each attacks despite countless media 
reports(Coll, 2014). This in term provoke 
anti-American view in Pakistan and also 
becomes a propaganda tool for the terrorist, 
insurgents, and even the ISI who sees these 
behavior as an epitome of American 
arrogance.   
Lastly, the means. This concerns with 
the human factor that is use to execute the 
ends and the ways of counterinsurgency 
operation, in particular their capability to 
fight and communicate with the locals. 
Here, the US counterterrorism operation 
and its use of the armed drones has not been 
gaining much favor of the local despite 
having eliminated numerous terrorists or 
insurgent leaders, commander, and key 
individual in the process. In truth the 
damage that the operation causes in the 
process and the reluctant of the US to fully 
acknowledge the (physical and mental) 
damage that its armed drone caused to the 
local population has becomes an obstacle 
for the locals to accept and fully supported 
the operation. They in term, sees this action 
as merely the lesser evil of what the 
terrorists or insurgents inflicted to them 
(Coll, 2014). 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
This study concludes that the targeted 
killing strategy performed by the US armed 
drones is ineffective. From Pape’s 
perspective we learned that the cause of the 
ineffectiveness is due to the attacks and 
elimination of the identified target 
set/center of gravity, that is the leadership 
of terrorist organization, is unable to result 
in the collapse/disintegration of terrorist 
organization. The reason for this is not 
because the armed drones inability to hit the 
intended target, though acknowledging that 
the weapon is not immune to the presence 
of targeting error, yet, overall it was able to 
do its job in eliminating the leadership and 
key individuals from terrorist organizations 
such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, TTP, 
Haqqani Network, etc. Rather the reason for 
its ineffectiveness is due to impact of 
leadership decapitation does not always 
resulted in the organization’s collapse or 
disintegration. Some organization can be 
more resilient to decapitation, while other 
are more susceptible. This condition occurs 
based on the nature of the organization 
itself. Here, past studies on the subject of 
leadership decapitation indicate that an 
older, religious, and decentralized tends to 
be more resilient toward this particular 
strategy. Therefore, the need for further 
organizational profiling and the 
understanding toward the source of 
organizational decline would come handy 
in the application of the strategy. 
On the other hand, Galula’s perspective 
provided a deeper understanding of the 
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strategy’s failure under the context of 
counterinsurgency. Here, the failure of the 
US to secure the ends, ways, and means of 
the operation which involve the dissociation 
between the population and the insurgents, 
their ability to forge proper cooperation 
with its local ally, and the un-favoring view 
of the local population toward its targeted 
killings practice has resulted in the 
infectivity of the strategy and a prolonged 
fight between the US and its opponent.     
 It is recognized that the armed drone is 
a necessary element for the US 
counterterrorism effort. For what is worth, 
the armed drone can be viewed as the least 
costly solution to the prolonged war against 
terrorism that the US had chosen to 
undergo. They lower the cost of using force 
by eliminating the risk of pilot being killed 
or captured; they can carry out targeted 
killing or supported the ground troops; they 
have operational advantage that 
conventional fighter jets lack that is it 
allowed for sustained and persistent flights 
(loiter) over potential targets; and in 
addition, even though armed drones usage 
may violate the sovereignty of a nation, yet, 
it reduce the diplomatic fallout that 
associated with the use of force to a lesser 
degree that putting the American troop on 
the territory or conducting a large-scale air 
campaign. 
Further evaluation of past studies also 
indicates that the criticism or review of the 
US armed drone usage oftentimes failed to 
take into account the fact that the 
alternatives are either too risky or 
unrealistic – to be sure, in an ideal world 
terrorist targets or militants would be 
captured alive, allowing authorities to 
interrogate them for vital intelligence and 
comb their compounds for useful 
information. But in reality war zones or 
unstable nations, like Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia, arresting terrorist targets or 
militant are highly dangerous and risky, 
even if successful, often inefficient. As 
such, within nations where the government 
held little or no control over remote areas, 
going after these targets hiding within the 
areas can be highly dangerous.  
For now, the armed drone remains as the 
best solution for the US in addressing the 
threat presented by global terrorist 
organizations and militancy. Additioanlly, 
relying on the armed drones alone would 
not be appropriate in winning the war. 
Nonetheless, without them it would also be 
difficult to win the war. So far armed drones 
have help the US counterterrorism 
operation against global terrorist 
organization but they have yet help the US 
to accomplish a decisive victory. 
Combating terrorism would require 
corresponding effort of military platform, 
strategy, intelligence, and diplomatic 
alliance of the involved actors, while 
keeping in mind that the opponent is not 
something that even a great power should 
diminish.       
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